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¶1 Many industry leaders have difficult decisions to make when it comes to 
participation in standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”).  On one hand, SSO membership 
offers its participants various incentives such as the ability to keep current with emerging 
technologies, guide their product development groups toward developing standard-
compliant products, and steer their organization’s research efforts in the direction of 
potential future standardization.1  On the other hand, when members fail to fully 
understand or comply with the SSOs’ often ambiguous patent policies, they not only risk 
forfeiting intellectual property rights in their technology,2 but may also face antitrust 
liability.3 
 
 *  Mr. Jakobsen is a 2005 Juris Doctor candidate at Northwestern University School of Law and received 
his Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology.  He would 
like to thank Professor Clinton Francis and Craig Kuchii for their invaluable assistance in the development 
of this comment. 
1 Benjamin Hershkowitz, Understanding the Potential Pitfalls Arising from Participation in Standards 
Bodies, 4 NO. 3 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 1 (2003). 
2 Id. 
3 See Richard Raysman et al., Intellectual Property Licensing: Forms and Analysis § 6.01(3)(c) (2003) 
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¶2 Considering these high stakes, the decision of whether to participate in an SSO 
should invariably include a cost-benefit analysis of the entity’s patent portfolio and the 
potential upside risks of participation in relation to any downside risks involved.4  
However, the “staggering lack of defining details”5 in many SSO patent policies presents 
a significant barrier to effectively evaluating such risks.  Due to the ad hoc nature in 
which several of these policies were drafted,6 important considerations about the policies 
and procedures governing disclosure of intellectual property, licensing, and voting are 
often vague and are sometimes not mentioned at all.7  As recent litigation of these issues 
has demonstrated, SSO patent policies must be revisited to ensure the clarification of 
patent rights upon participation in SSOs and also to encourage increased industry 
participation so the standards adopted will represent the best of breed technologies that an 
efficiently operated SSO is capable of producing. 
¶3 This hypothetical “efficiently operated SSO” is in everyone’s best interest, 
including industry leaders in a particular technology and other companies that wish to 
develop and sell products that are compliant with standardized technologies.8  However, 
probably the most significant benefit of increased efficiency and participation in SSOs 
can be gained by the general consuming public because “[t]he competitive benefits that 
accrue from establishing standards are well recognized to reside in increased consumer 
welfare, enhancement of consumer choice and lower production costs.”9 
¶4 This article discusses the current state of industry standards and SSOs in Part II.  
The legal context for SSOs and their patent policies is presented in Part III.  Finally, in 
Part IV, some potential improvements to SSO patent policies are suggested and analyzed. 
II. INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND SSOS 
¶5 Although many of us do not realize it, we are surrounded by standardization every 
day.  From simple concepts, such as the electrical outlet, to advanced interfaces that 
allow our computers to function, modern societies rely on standardized products for both 
interoperability and increased safety.10  As one commentator has noted, “[c]ollaborative 
standard setting is pervasive in the modern economy and increasingly important to 
healthy competition in numerous industries.”11  This section will discuss standards 
 
(discussing patent licensing in relation to SSOs).  Although several cases and articles discuss the antitrust 
implications of participating in SSOs, an in depth antitrust analysis is outside the scope of this article. 
4 See Don Featherstone & Evan Smith, Patents That Cover Industry Standards: Companies Risk Losing 
Patents by Failing to Disclose, 21 INTELL. PROP. NEWSL. NO. 4, 8 (2003) (noting that “some companies 
choose to avoid participating in standards committees in areas where they have substantial patent rights”). 
5 Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
6 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1889, 1956 (2002).  Professor Lemley’s article contains significant empirical analysis of over forty 
different SSOs and includes an appendix which summarizes the intellectual property policies for each. 
7 See Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1102. 
8 See David M. Schneck, Note, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 641, 642-43 (1998). 
9 Robert P. Taylor, Standard Setting: A Growing Morass, INTELL. PROP. ANTITRUST 2002, at 545, 547 
(2002). 
10 This article focuses solely on interoperability standards because safety standards committees are 
usually able to “design around” any IP rights that may exist, thus negating the problems inherent in 
interoperability SSOs.  See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1898. 
11 Taylor, supra note 9, at 547. 
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generally, the positive and negative impacts of SSOs, and how SSO patent policies 
currently regulate participation in these organizations. 
A. Standards Generally and Network Effects 
¶6 The definition of a standard that I have adopted for this article is “any set of 
technical specifications that either provides or is intended to provide a common design 
for a product or process.”12  This broad definition was crafted by Professor Mark Lemley, 
one of the leading legal authorities on SSOs, and it is appropriate for the purposes of this 
comment. 
1. A Standard Example 
¶7 As mentioned above,13 a very simple example of a standard is an electrical outlet.  
The standard for electrical outlets includes specifications describing the voltage, 
impedance, and plug shape necessary for an electrical outlet to comply with the 
standard.14  Because virtually all electrical outlets in the United States conform to these 
simple specifications, people are assured that when they purchase any electrical device 
with a standard electrical plug, they will be able to use that product anywhere in the 
country.15 
¶8 Although this example of a standard is relatively simplistic, it illustrates the 
importance of standards in today’s economy quite effectively.  Try to imagine traveling 
with a laptop computer if the electrical outlet standard had never been adopted.  Most 
likely, you would need to carry an electrical plug converter with you for every different 
variation of electrical outlet you may encounter on your trip.  Considering the numerous 
standardized products that each of us use on a daily basis,16 the value of standardization 
to the consuming public is quite significant. 
2. Standardization and Network Effects 
¶9 The significance of standardization becomes even greater when entire networks are 
connected and standardized.  The reason for this is that the value of the entire network 
increases as more and more users are added to the network.17  In fact, consumers often 
benefit more from a standardized product’s interoperability with other similar products 
than from the product itself.18  This concept is called a network effect. 
 
12 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1896. 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1896. 
15 This example illustrates an important point.  Although many standards may be considered worldwide 
standards (e.g. protocols for connecting to the internet), some standards are local to a particular region (e.g., 
electrical outlets in the United States specify different voltage requirements than in other countries). 
16 For example, most 120V AC electrical devices, telephone services, internet connections or connection 
services, automobile ignition systems, and light bulbs are all standardized devices or services that we 
frequently utilize without thinking about the standards upon which they are based.  See Lemley, supra note 
6, at 1896. 
17 Id. at 1896-97. 
18 Id. 
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¶10 The paradigmatic example of a network effect is one that is familiar to everyone - 
telephone service.  In this particular example, a consumer elicits absolutely no benefit 
from the network compatible product itself (i.e., the telephone), but the consumer does 
reap significant benefits from the value of the network when viewed as a whole.  
Consider, for example, if you were the only person in the world with a telephone.  In this 
extreme case, your telephone would be useless.  However, if more and more users were 
brought online within the network, your telephone’s value would rapidly increase.19 
¶11 As this example shows, the intrinsic value of the telephone network system, instead 
of being tied to the product itself, is proportional to the number of users connected to the 
system.20  In other words, the true value of the telephone network is best described as the 
ability of one user to interact with other users on the same network using their 
standardized network compatible products.  Therefore, standardized products in a heavily 
networked industry are often self-perpetuating.  Consumers have an incentive to buy 
products that are compatible with a widely standardized network because it increases the 
value of the particular product they have purchased.21  Also, firms have an incentive to 
provide their customers with standardized products because the increased usage of the 
network creates an ever-expanding potential market for their products.22 
¶12 One of the unique aspects of network effects is that the inherent value of the 
individual standardized product is often lower than the value of the interconnectedness 
that the network offers.  Therefore, the chosen standard is actually of less importance 
than the industry’s ability to agree on one single standard.  Interestingly, this is true 
whether the chosen standard is indeed the best technological option or not.23  This may 
initially seem to undermine any argument that increased membership in SSOs would lead 
to improved standards, at least in the case of standardization of networked products.  
However, even SSOs implementing network standards would benefit from increased 
membership because, as a practical matter, with more technology presented to the SSO, 
there is greater potential for equally viable but less expensive alternatives to be 
suggested.24 
3. How are Standards Established? 
¶13 Standards are generally established in one of three traditional ways: de facto 
standards may be created by the market, a standard-setting organization may choose a 
standard, or the government may mandate a certain standard.25  De facto standards are 
 
19 Jack E. Brown, Technology Joint Ventures to Set Standards or Define Interfaces, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 
921, 923 (1993). 
20 James C. De Vellis, Patenting Industry Standards: Balancing the Rights of Patent Holders With the 
Need for Industry-Wide Standards, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 301, 306 (2003). 
21 This phenomenon is generally known as “tipping.”  Lemley, supra note 6, at 1897. 
22 De Vellis, supra note 20, at 305.  See also Schneck, supra note 8, at 642-43. 
23 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1897. 
24 As an example, if an SSO is made up of firms A and B, only those two firms can make suggestions 
for potential standardized technology.  If their two equally adequate alternatives cost $1000 and $1200 
respectively to implement, the $1000 solution will be chosen.  However, if firm C is now persuaded to join 
the SSO, there is a chance that it may be able to suggest another viable solution that costs only $800 to 
implement.  Obviously, if firm C never participates, the $1000 standard that is chosen will still be valuable, 
but less so than the $800 standard. 
25 Daniel J. Gifford, Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues Under the 
Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws, 43 IDEA 331, 338-39 (2003). 
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created when, absent any type of agreement or mandate, a significant share of a particular 
industry’s products conform to a given set of characteristics.26  Because these types of 
standards are not the result of industry agreements or created by an organized group, they 
do not implicate the same issues as standards promulgated by SSOs27 and are therefore 
beyond the scope of this article.  Similarly, government mandated standards, the number 
of which are currently decreasing in favor of increased responsibility on the private sector 
to establish standards, also present different issues than are addressed here.28  Therefore, 
the analysis contained in this article is confined to those issues that are related to private 
industry standard-setting organizations. 
B. SSOs – Positive and Negative Impacts 
¶14 Several different industries and sectors have standards bodies associated with them.  
Some of the more recognizable SSOs include the World Wide Web Consortium29 
(“W3C”), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers30 (“IEEE”), the Internet 
Engineering Task Force31 (“IETF”), and the American National Standards Institute32 
(“ANSI”).  “The general goal of standard-setting organizations is to benefit the general 
public by creating widely adopted industry standards.”33  When implemented correctly, 
SSOs are generally able to meet that goal.  However, some internal inefficiencies may 
cause standardization results that are less than ideal. 
¶15 The first significant inefficiency is that low participation among industry leaders 
may hinder technological innovation.34  This inefficiency is particularly problematic and 
is the subject this article addresses.  The lack of participation by industry experts results 
in a less-informed standards body, which in turn may potentially lead to the adoption of 
an inadequate35 standard.36  Importantly, industry leaders with the most technological 
 
26 Id. at 339-40.  “To take just one example, the Microsoft operating systems are clearly de facto 
standards; no SSO ‘adopted’ them as the preferred or official operating systems, but the market chose 
Microsoft as the winner of a standards competition.”  Lemley, supra note 6, at 1899. 
27 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1899-1900. 
28 Id. at 1900. 
29 “The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) develops interoperable technologies (specifications, 
guidelines, software, and tools) to lead the Web to its full potential.” Worldwide Web Consortium, at 
http://www.w3c.org (last visited Nov. 18, 2004). 
30 “[T]he IEEE is a leading authority in technical areas ranging from computer engineering, biomedical 
technology and telecommunications, to electric power, aerospace and consumer electronics, among others.  
Through its technical publishing, conferences and consensus-based standards activities, the IEEE . . . has 
nearly 900 active standards with 700 under development.”  About the IEEE, at 
http://www.ieee.org/portal/index.jsp?pageID=corp_level1&path=about& file=index.xml&xsl=generic.xsl 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2004). 
31 “The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a large open international community of network 
designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and 
the smooth operation of the Internet.  It is open to any interested individual.”  Overview of the IETF, at 
http://www.ietf.org/overview.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004). 
32 ANSI’s “mission is to enhance both the global competitiveness of U.S. business and the U.S. quality 
of life by promoting and facilitating voluntary consensus standards and conformity assessment systems, 
and safeguarding their integrity.”  Overview, at 
http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2004). 
33 De Vellis, supra note 20, at 336.  See also S. Bradner, The Internet Standards Process–Revision 
Three (Oct. 1996), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt (last visited Nov. 18, 2004). 
34 See, e.g., De Vellis, supra note 20, at 343-44. 
35 The use of the term “inadequate” does not imply that a standard would not necessarily work or would 
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expertise and with significant patent portfolios in a particular field are those who have the 
most to lose in terms of patent rights if for some reason they do not adhere to a given 
patent policy.  Therefore, the members that an SSO would most value in terms of their 
knowledge and expertise are the same entities that are the least likely to participate in 
SSOs for fear of losing their valuable intellectual property rights.37 
¶16 Another potential inefficiency is caused by the terms of some of the SSO patent 
policies themselves.  Many SSOs strongly discourage standards which implicate current 
IP rights, and some SSOs actually forbid standards that are based on patented 
technology.38  As a counter-balance, many of the SSOs that discourage but allow 
standardizing on patented technologies require their members to license the use of that 
technology on either a royalty-free (“RF”) or a reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(“RAND”)39 basis.40  Those SSOs that forbid patent-based standards disallow 
standardizing on a patented technology even if that technology would otherwise be 
 
not be beneficial to society.  Rather, it is used to demonstrate that, if an SSO were operating with more 
information, it would have settled on a better standard. 
36 “If a standard-setting organization adopts an inferior standard because someone owns a patent on a 
superior technology and refuses to make it available on RF terms, the standard-setting organization runs a 
real risk that the chosen standard will not be widely adopted.”  De Vellis, supra note 20, at 343. 
37 See Schneck, supra note 8, at 647. 
38 See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1905-06. 
39 Interestingly enough, many patent polices do not explicitly define what is meant by RF or RAND 
licensing.  However, the W3C offers the following definitions: 
A RAND License: 
“shall mean a license that: 
shall be available to all implementers worldwide, whether or not they are W3C Members; 
shall extend to all Essential Claims owned or controlled by the licensor and its Affiliates . . .; 
may be limited to implementations of the Recommendation, and to what is required by the 
Recommendation; 
may be conditioned on a grant of a reciprocal RAND License to all Essential Claims owned or 
controlled by the licensee and its Affiliates. For example, a reciprocal license may be required to 
be available to all, and a reciprocal license may itself be conditioned on a further reciprocal 
license from all (including, in the case of a license to a Contribution, the original licensee); 
may be conditioned on payment of reasonable, non-discriminatory royalties or fees; 
may not impose any further conditions or restrictions on the use of any technology, intellectual 
property rights, or other restrictions on behavior of the licensee, but may include reasonable, 
customary terms relating to operation or maintenance of the license relationship such as the 
following: audit (when relevant to fees), choice of law, and dispute resolution.” 
Daniel J. Weitzner, Current Patent Practice, W3C Note 24, at http://www.w3.org/TR/patent-practice 
(January 2002) (last visited Dec. 19, 2004). 
A RF License: 
“shall have the same characteristics as a RAND License, except that a Royalty-Free License: 
may not be conditioned on payment of royalties, fees or other consideration except for the 
conditions permitted in the clauses of RAND License other than clause 5; 
may require that all licensees make any Essential Claims they control available to all on a no-
royalty basis; 
shall not be considered accepted by an implementer who manifests an intent not to accept the 
terms of the Royalty-Free License as offered by the licensor.” 
Id. 
40 While there is a significant amount of literature devoted to RF and RAND licenses, the De Vellis 
article contains an interesting discussion of why RAND licenses are economically preferable to RF 
licenses.  De Vellis, supra note 20. 
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viewed as the best solution.  Therefore, SSOs utilizing this policy will invariably 
standardize technologies that are less efficient or less technologically advanced.41  
Similarly, for those SSOs that merely discourage patent-based standards, the extra effort 
in attempting to design around the patented technology is likely to create inefficiencies 
within the organizational process of choosing and implementing a given standard. 
¶17 While these inefficiencies may be present in one form or another in virtually every 
SSO, an overwhelming majority of commentators still view SSOs as having a positive 
influence on their particular industries and on society as a whole.42  However, although 
SSOs currently propagate many worthwhile and valuable standards to the consuming 
public, there is an opportunity for even greater benefit.  If SSOs can eliminate or at least 
limit their inefficiencies, they would significantly improve the likelihood of creating 
more technologically advanced and cost-effective standards.43 
C. SSO Patent Policies 
¶18 Many SSO patent policies were initially created as ad hoc agreements44 that were 
modified as problems arose and are, therefore, not particularly well thought-out 
documents.45  Not surprisingly, then, SSO policies often vary significantly, even if the 
SSOs are in the same or similar industries and the policies share the same goals.  
Although the policies are very dissimilar in most respects, the unifying issues that are 
critical to understanding a given SSO’s stance on IP include (1) whether the policy covers 
patents, trademarks, copyrights, or any combination, (2) whether and what type of 
disclosure of IP is required, (3) whether a search for IP is required, (4) whether the 
standards body can adopt a standard that relies on IP, and (5) what licensing provisions 
are required amongst members and to outsiders.46 
¶19 Because the majority of litigation in this area has involved patent rights rather than 
trademarks or copyrights, this article focuses primarily on the patent policies of SSOs.  In 
addition, this article is limited to SSOs with IP disclosure requirements because, if there 
is no duty to disclose IP, a participant’s IP rights are not put at any risk.  However, the 
remaining issues require further examination. 
¶20 According to Lemley’s empirical study, the majority of SSOs require IP disclosure 
of some sort.47  When applicable, the types of disclosures required can be broken into two 
categories: (1) issued patents only or (2) issued patents and applications pending in the 
Patent and Trademark Office.  Also, according to the statements in the policies, most of 
the SSOs do not require participating members to search their own patent portfolios to 
determine disclosure, but rather the participants may rely on the member’s reasonable 
beliefs.48  While SSOs often discourage selecting a standard that implicates patented 
 
41 Id. at 341-43. 
42 See generally Lemley, supra note 6.  See also Brown, supra note 19. 
43 See De Vellis, supra note 20. 
44 See infra Part I; see also Lemley, supra note 6, at 1956. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1973.  Professor Lemley uses these five distinguishing factors to demonstrate the differences in 
the SSO IP policies included in his empirical study. 
47 Id. at 1904. 
48 Id. at 1905. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 4  
 
50 
technology, many of the SSOs allow such standards to be adopted.49  However, most of 
the SSOs that allow standards based on patents also require the patent holder to offer 
RAND licenses to the other members of the SSO50 and sometimes even to non-
members.51 
¶21 Another finding of Lemley’s study was that many firms that participate in SSOs 
join multiple organizations.52  The importance of this finding is that, with such disparity 
in the patent policies of different SSOs, “it is very difficult for IP owners to know ex ante 
what rules will govern their rights.”53  Also, to fully understand the implications of 
joining any new SSO, companies must thoroughly investigate the bylaws of that SSO.54  
As a practical matter, Lemley notes that many companies are unlikely to conduct these 
preliminary investigations, and therefore, they are “unlikely to be fully informed about 
their IP position.”55  This is especially true when, as in most corporate decisions to join 
SSOs, IP attorneys are very rarely consulted.56  As will later be shown,57 these 
uninformed positions have often led to legal problems for members who have failed to 
comply with the SSO patent policies. 
III. SSOS IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
¶22 Several legal issues are raised by a firm’s decision to participate in an SSO.  For 
instance, SSO members face risks of seriously endangering their patent rights by 
disclosing their IP too early, thus beginning the one year countdown for patent 
application filing deadlines,58 and potentially allowing the standards committee to design 
around their IP rights.59  However, by disclosing patent rights too late or not at all, the 
participant may subject him or herself to legal action brought by the SSO itself, by other 
members of the SSO, or even by the Federal Trade Commission.60  In addition, because 
SSOs often involve groups of industry competitors who collaborate to create standards, 
antitrust issues may occasionally arise. 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1906. 
51 Although only two of the SSOs studied explicitly included language requiring RAND licensing to 
everyone, it is not clear that the other SSOs intended their policies to include licenses only for their 
members.  Id. 
52 As an example, “in 1998 Sun Microsystems participated in eighty-seven different SSOs.”  Id. at 1907. 
53 Id. at 1906-07. 
54 This investigation must include an examination of the duty of disclosure as well as the duty of 
licensing.  Full comprehension of the duty of disclosure requires a thorough understanding of the following 
factors: (1) when required disclosure begins; (2) when required disclosure ends; (3) to whom the duty of 
disclosure applies; (4) how to disclose; (5) when to disclose; (6) what to disclose; (7) what IP rights to 
disclose; (8) what duties of searching are required; and (9) what the scope of the standard is so that the firm 
can determine whether or not its patent rights are implicated.  Laura Majerus & Robin Reasoner, 
Participation in Standard-Setting Organizations, 4 NO. 6 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 1 (2003). 
55 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1907. 
56 Id. 
57 See infra Part III.B. 
58 Hershkowitz, supra note 1; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
59 Hershkowitz, supra note 1. 
60 See, e.g., In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
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A. SSOs and Potential Antitrust Concerns 
¶23 While SSOs may facially resemble collusion among groups of competitors in a 
particular industry, antitrust concerns have been relatively minimal in the context of 
standard setting.61  It is true that SSOs have the power to create agreements between 
horizontal competitors that could “raise prices, reduce output or otherwise diminish 
competitive options.”62  However, in general, antitrust liabilities under the Sherman Act63 
do not attach to otherwise legitimate SSO activities.64 
¶24 One of the main reasons courts are hesitant to condemn such cooperative activities, 
even among horizontal competitors, is that they have recognized and accepted the overall 
public benefit created by standards.65  This is not to say that SSOs should be exempted 
automatically from antitrust scrutiny, but when they are operated legitimately,66 the courts 
have generally found SSO activities to be consistent with antitrust goals.67  In fact, most 
legitimate SSOs even foster competition among competitors.68  It is unlikely that any of 
the suggested SSO patent policy alternatives contained within this article raise additional 
antitrust concerns.  Therefore, SSOs will not be prone to any increased scrutiny upon 
their implementation. 
B. Legal Doctrines Utilized in Evaluating SSO Member Conduct 
¶25 Although the defendants’ actions in many of the alleged SSO misconduct cases 
may seem facially wrongful, the main difficulty courts have had in assessing the 
allegations is finding an appropriate doctrine under which to analyze the cases.  This is 
because SSO membership, on its own, does not fit neatly into a classical legal 
framework.  Therefore, courts have applied legal doctrines such as equitable estoppel,69 
implied licensing,70 antitrust,71 and fraud72 to attach liability to the actions of SSO 
participants’ misconduct. 
¶26 In one of the earliest actions involving misconduct by an SSO member, Stambler v. 
Diebold, the court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent Stambler from 
profiting by remaining silent as a member of an SSO which was contemplating a standard 
that implicated his patent rights.73  Even though the SSO did not have a policy that 
 
61 See Brown, supra note 19, at 931. 
62 Id. at 925. 
63 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). 
64 Brown, supra note 19, at 925. 
65 Id. at 925-26. 
66 As an example of an SSO operating illegitimately, the Supreme Court affirmed a violation of the 
Sherman Act when it was found that over 200 participants were recruited to join an SSO and were 
instructed how to vote on a particular standard.  Id. at 927-28 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian 
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988)). 
67 Brown, supra note 19, at 925. 
68 Wynee Carvill & Khurshid Khoja, Antitrust Issues Presented in Setting Interoperability Standards, 
INTELL. PROP. ANTITRUST 2003 279 (2003). 
69 See, e.g., Stambler v. Diebold, Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 1709 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 878 F.2d 
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished). 
70 See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
71 See, e.g., In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
72 See, e.g., Rambus Inc., 318 F.3d at 1084. 
73 Stambler, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1714-15. 
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explicitly required disclosure, because Stambler knew that the SSO was considering his 
patented technology for standardization and subsequently left the SSO without informing 
them of his patent, the court ruled that he had a duty to speak.74  In light of this duty to 
speak, Stambler’s silence was found to be affirmatively misleading to the SSO, and he 
was therefore estopped from asserting patent infringement claims against Diebold.75 
¶27 In Wang Laboratories v. Mitsubishi Electronics America,76 the two parties were 
both members of the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council77 (“JEDEC”).  
Mitsubishi accused Wang of misleading JEDEC by concealing a pending patent 
application that would be implicated by the Single In-Line Memory Modules (“SIMM”) 
standard that was being contemplated.78  The Federal Circuit upheld a finding that, 
although equitable estoppel did not apply, Wang had granted Mitsubishi an implied 
license to use its patented technology based on the exchange of technical information, the 
two having worked together in joint development efforts, and other significant dealings 
between the two companies.79  Because a finding of equitable estoppel did not apply, 
however, Wang was still permitted to continue asserting its patent rights against others.80 
¶28 In 1995, the Federal Trade Commission challenged Dell’s allegedly wrongful 
activities while it was a member of the Video Electronic Standards Association 
(“VESA”) under a theory of antitrust.81  According to the FTC’s complaint, Dell 
representatives sat as members at meetings of VESA’s Local Bus (“VL-bus”) Committee, 
which approved the VL-bus standard.82  Following committee approval, the VL-bus 
standard was brought before the entire voting membership of VESA, and a Dell 
representative voted in favor of approving the standard.  As part of the voting process, the 
representative also certified that, to the best of his knowledge, the proposal would not 
infringe on any of Dell’s IP rights.83  Eight months after the standard was adopted, and 
following its widespread use in over 1.4 million computers, Dell claimed that 
implementing the VL-bus standard violated Dell’s patent rights.84  Although the facts 
pertaining to Dell’s actual participation in VESA and its required IP disclosures were 
somewhat unclear and were never litigated, Dell settled by way of a consent decree that 
estopped Dell from asserting its patent rights against the VL-Bus technology for a period 
of ten years.85 
¶29 The most recent case alleging violations of an SSO patent policy also involved 
participants of the JEDEC86 standards body.  In Rambus, a jury found that Rambus had 
committed fraud on the SSO by failing to disclose pending patent applications to the 
 
74 Id. at 1715. 
75 Id. 
76 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
77 This SSO is now known as the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association, which is a 
“semiconductor engineering standardization body of the Electronic Industries Alliance.”  About JEDEC, 
available at http://www.jedec.org/Home/about_jedec.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2003). 
78 Wang, 103 F.3d at 1573-77. 
79 Id. at 1579-82. 
80 See Taylor, supra note 9, at 562-63. 
81 In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
82 Id. at 617. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 617-18. 
85 Id. at 619-23.  See also Taylor, supra note 9, at 552-53. 
86 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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standards body.87  While the JEDEC policy clearly requires disclosure of issued patents 
with claims that directly read on to a proposed standard,88 the policy is much less clear as 
to whether disclosure of patent applications are required.89  In reversing the district 
court’s ruling of fraud, the Federal Circuit stated that the JEDEC policy demonstrated a 
“staggering lack of defining details” and noted that, “[w]hen direct competitors 
participate in an open standards committee, their work necessitates a written patent policy 
with clear guidance on the committee’s intellectual property position.”90  The court 
further declared that “[a] policy that does not define clearly what, when, how, and to 
whom the members must disclose does not provide a firm basis for the disclosure duty 
necessary for a fraud verdict.”91  Although JEDEC subsequently filed an amicus brief 
with the Supreme Court in support of Infineon’s position and claiming that the majority 
opinion in Rambus had essentially rendered its patent policy ineffective and 
unworkable,92 the Federal Circuit correctly noted that it was the JEDEC patent policy 
itself that was ineffective and unworkable.93  Infineon’s petition for certiorari was 
recently denied by the Supreme Court.94 
IV. REVISITING SSO PATENT POLICIES 
¶30 As evidenced by the previous discussion of the problems with current SSO patent 
policies95 and the recent litigation involving them,96 it seems apparent that some changes 
are necessary to prevent further lawsuits and generally improve the standard-setting 
process itself.  This section first discusses some minor modifications that would improve 
the enforceability and predictability of these policies.  Next, three forward-looking 
alternatives with greater potential for increased SSO membership and efficiency are 
presented.  These alternatives would require increased implementation efforts and require 
considerable thought by individual SSOs to determine whether one or more of the 
alternatives would fit within their particular framework. 
A.  “Fine-Tuning” Current SSO Patent Policies 
¶31 As previously mentioned, courts have applied traditional legal doctrines such as 
contract, estoppel, fraud, and antitrust to analyze whether allegedly wrongful behavior by 
one or more SSO participants is legally unjust.97  However, the courts have been hesitant 
 
87 Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
88 If patent claims directly read on to a proposed standard, the standard cannot be practiced without 
infringing the patent claims.  Id. at 1102-03. 
89 There was also some question as to whether JEDEC members were adequately informed of their 
disclosure obligations throughout the standardization process, but the court did not need to reach this issue.  
Id. at 1096-1102. 
90 Id. at 1102. 
91 Id. 
92 Brief of Amicus Curiae JEDEC Solid State Technology Association in Support of Petitioners, 2003 
WL 22428462, at *3 (Aug. 6, 2003), Infineon Techs. AG v. Rambus, Inc., 124 S.Ct. 227 (2003) (No. 03-
37). 
93 See Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
94 Infineon Techs. AG v. Rambus, Inc., 124 S.Ct. 227 (2003). 
95 See infra Parts II.B-C. 
96 See infra Part III.B. 
97 See infra Part III. 
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to attach liability when the SSO patent policies are too ambiguous or vague.  As the 
Federal Circuit decision in Rambus points out, “after-the-fact morphing of a vague, 
loosely defined policy to capture actions not within the actual scope of that policy” would 
likely chill participation in SSOs just as much as a lack of compliance with well-defined 
patent policies.98  The court implies that, if SSOs could create well-defined patent policies 
and courts are allowed to enforce these policies more effectively, industry participation 
would increase due to a clearer understanding of the potential risks involved and a better 
idea of how to avoid such risks. 
¶32 With these guidelines in mind, there are a few things SSOs can do to “fine-tune” 
their current patent policies that will render them more definite and legally enforceable.  
On an individual basis, SSOs should first examine their written patent policies to 
determine what revisions, if any, are necessary.  Initially, they should determine whether 
the who, what, when, and how questions have been answered in terms of IP disclosure, 
licensing, and voting practices.99  Next, the SSOs should more thoroughly examine each 
of these issues to ensure clarity and specificity.  While not strictly necessary, the policies 
should also include considerations such as who owes a duty to whom and when this duty 
attaches, who will decide the terms of a RAND license and whether these decisions are 
subject to any limitations, and what arbitration proceedings are in place for its members 
to easily resolve potential disputes.100 
¶33 The next step requires the SSOs to ensure that its members are sufficiently aware of 
its patent policies.101  Although it may be possible to argue that the obligations expressed 
in the SSO bylaws should be imposed implicitly on its members just by joining the 
organization,102 a better solution would be to require each member to read and sign the 
patent policies upon joining the SSO and any time the policy is revised.  A further 
improvement on this idea would be to require the signature of a firm’s in-house counsel 
certifying that the firm agrees to abide by the SSO’s patent policies.103 
¶34 Undertaking these seemingly simple tasks would have prevented much of the 
litigation mentioned above.  While these changes would not immediately improve the 
efficiency of SSOs, the long term effect would be that each existing and potential 
member and potential member would have a better understanding of its IP rights upon 
membership.  This would not only provide the benefit of decreased litigation, but it 
would also encourage increased membership because the risks and rewards of 
participation could be more adequately analyzed. 
B. More Dramatic Approaches 
¶35 Although all SSOs would be well-served by “fine tuning” their current patent 
policies, the following three alternatives offer a paradigm shift from the way SSO patent 
 
98 Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1102 n.10.  See also Schneck, supra note 8, at 647 (arguing that SSO members 
will only participate “if the integrity of the standard-setting process is secure”). 
99 See Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1102 (ruling that, if a patent policy does not clearly and explicitly define its 
stance on these issues, it is not enforceable). 
100 See Hershkowitz, supra note 1. 
101 See Schneck, supra note 8, at 661. 
102 Id. 
103 See Featherstone & Smith, supra note 4, at 8 (suggesting the importance of obtaining legal counsel 
and informing them of a firm’s proposed membership in SSOs). 
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policies are currently implemented.  While any one or more of the following options may 
add considerable value to a particular SSO, a thorough evaluation of each option must be 
made by the SSOs on an individual basis to determine its potential effectiveness within 
that SSO’s objectives.104 
1. Standardizing the Patent Policy Framework 
¶36 The first alternative is the least dramatic of the three and involves a standardization 
of the SSO patent policy framework itself by creating a standard set of rules and options 
that are clearly and concisely defined.  Although at first glance this option would seem to 
fit squarely within the purview of the SSOs themselves, this standardized taxonomy 
would likely have to be created by an external source.105  Ideally, a dream team of 
experienced patent attorneys who are conversant in SSO membership terms would form a 
sort of SSO of their own to create a set of basic standards to which all SSOs should 
conform.  While it is impossible to create a single set of rules that incorporates the goals 
and objectives of every SSO,106 there are certainly basic criteria107 and options that could 
be standardized. 
¶37 For example, although not all SSOs require their members to disclose IP, those that 
do should have standardized language that details what types of IP must be disclosed and 
when the IP must be disclosed.  Obviously, there are different options within each of 
these categories.  In terms of the types of IP that must be disclosed, the policy should 
specify whether it covers patents, copyrights, trademarks or any combination of the three.  
The policy should also say explicitly if it covers pending applications or only issued 
patents. 
¶38 By clearly specifying these types of issues in a standardized taxonomy across 
different SSOs, members can more easily become aware of what is expected from their 
participation in any particular SSO, thus lowering participation barriers.108  If a member 
violates these expectations, it would be subject to examination by a procedure that could 
also be clearly defined in the policy.  By standardizing the language and format of SSO 
policies such that any member of an SSO can easily compare which rules are the same or 
different than in any other given SSO, members would be able to join multiple SSOs with 
fewer concerns about losing their IP rights due to non-compliance. 
¶39 In addition, a standardized framework would allow more efficient adjudication by 
the courts in the case of any alleged misconduct.  While the courts currently have to 
examine both the factual situation of how a defendant acted and the legal concepts of 
what duties are imposed by the often ambiguous patent policies, a standardized 
framework would include what duties are imposed on the SSO participants and when and 
 
104 See Alden F. Abbott & Theodore A. Gebhard, Standard-Setting Disclosure Policies: Evaluating 
Antitrust Concerns in Light of Rambus, 16-SUM ANTITRUST 29, 34 (2002) (emphasizing that there are no 
“one size fits all” policies). 
105 The reason for this is simply the difficulty a current SSO would have in looking outside the group to 
determine what types of best practices already exist. 
106 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
107 See infra Part II.C. 
108 The strength of this conclusion is contingent on a significant number of SSOs choosing to conform 
their patent policies to a standardized format and taxonomy.  However, lesser conformance will still 
provide some of the benefits of cross-SSO participation and efficient judicial economy discussed in this 
section. 
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under what circumstances those duties attach.  Since the rules would be clearly defined, 
the parties are more likely to settle their differences out of court to avoid the costs of 
litigation.  Also, even if the dispute progressed to trial, the main issues would be factual 
rather than legal. 
¶40 After the admittedly complicated task of creating such a standardized framework, 
the most imposing barrier to implementing this framework would be convincing the 
SSOs to change their policies.  Most members of SSOs never have to face litigation 
involving standardization, and therefore, individual SSOs are likely to resist “fixing” 
what, to them, is not broken.  However, if the model SSO policies are both broad enough 
to cover the wide range of options currently implemented and specific enough to allow 
plug-and-play choices by SSOs as to which options they want in their policies, there 
should be little resistance to such a change.  After all, it would limit their members’ risks 
associated with joining and would not create an overly onerous burden to implement. 
2. Screening Procedures 
¶41 Another possibility for improving industry participation in SSOs is to offer 
membership with less risk of losing patent rights by having the individual participants 
“screened” from any research and development teams that are working on the types of 
technology being standardized.  This procedure would be very similar to legal ethics rules 
which allow attorneys in a law firm to work on matters which would otherwise create a 
conflict of interest. 
¶42 Though this is a relatively novel approach, the dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Azcuenaga in the Dell case seems to support such a procedure.109  In 
particular, the commissioner was troubled by the fact that vicarious knowledge transfer in 
a corporation as large as Dell “would place [Dell’s] intellectual property at risk simply by 
participating in the standards-setting process.”110 The commissioner further explained 
that, if VESA’s intent was to impute an entire organization’s knowledge to its 
representative attending the SSO meetings, VESA could have made this clear in its patent 
policy, but it did not.111  She also suggested that there was likely a good reason for not 
explicitly including this language in the policy.  Namely, if that language had been 
included, the voting process “likely would have been quite prolonged and, perhaps, even 
impossible.”112 
¶43 Rule 1.0(k) of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct defines its screening process as “the isolation of a lawyer from any participation 
in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably 
adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is 
 
109 See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 630 (1996) (dissenting statement of Comm’r Mary 
L. Azcuenaga). 
110 Id.  Commissioner Azcuenaga also cites commentary by other SSOs weighing in on the prospect of 
vicarious knowledge transfer and notes that, “[f]or firms with hundreds of employees involved in 
standards-setting and with tens of thousands of patents, an affirmative obligation to search for patents 
would present the choice of either avoiding standards-setting or placing their intellectual property at risk.”  
Id. at 635-36. 
111 Id. at 630. 
112 Id. 
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obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.”113  One of the comments following 
the rule offers useful insight into how the drafting board envisioned screening procedures 
being set up to avoid such conflicts: 
The specific screening measures that are appropriate for any particular 
matter will depend on the circumstances but should provide reasonable 
assurance that there will be no significant risk to any information that the 
disqualified lawyer is obligated to protect.  Where appropriate, such 
procedures could include a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to 
avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with 
any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and 
instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication 
with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the 
screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and 
periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and other firm 
personnel.114 
¶44 This language offers the starting point for the analogous SSO screening procedures 
suggested below. 
¶45 The important elements that should be adopted by an SSO screening procedure are 
that the screening must occur prior to any participation in the SSO, and the screening 
must be reasonably adequate to protect against the participant’s interaction with both the 
research team members and any corporate information about the research in that 
particular technology.  While the individual SSOs may decide what types of written 
agreements are necessary to fulfill the “reasonably adequate protection” element, they 
should spend enough time on the agreements to make them detailed and specific enough 
that the corporate members can understand exactly what is expected of them.  Further, 
they must be written clearly enough so that the courts will be able to enforce the 
agreements in the case of any potential conflicts.115 
¶46 One concern with the implementation of such screening procedures is that 
engineers and researchers are not legally bound by a code of ethics as are lawyers.116  
However, by requiring written contracts of each individual purporting to be screened 
from his or her corporate peers, courts should be able to enforce these rules much as they 
have enforced SSO patent policies under contractual theories in the past.  While the proof 
of such misconduct may seem daunting or even impossible at first glance, bear in mind 
that the same investigatory and evidentiary problems with proving lawyer misconduct 
within a firm is at least equally as challenging.  Also, the SSOs could include language in 
the contracts such that, if a company’s IP is implicated in a standard that was suggested 
or voted upon by its “screened” representative without disclosure of that IP, the behavior 
becomes presumptively wrongful. 
 
113 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(k) (2002). 
114 Id. cmt. 9. 
115 These agreements could also follow a standardized format and taxonomy to ensure clarity and 
enforceability.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
116 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2002). 
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¶47 Importantly, and analogous to screening procedures for lawyers, this presumption 
that the “screened” representative has wrongfully violated the terms of the screening 
agreement must be rebuttable.117  In an instance where a screened SSO representative is 
presumed to have violated the screening agreement, the presumption could be rebutted by 
evidence that proves the establishment of timely screening procedures that were carefully 
constructed and followed.118  However, by taking this logical step of allowing an SSO to 
presumptively prove misconduct by one of its members, the added incentive for 
corporations to participate is somewhat limited because of the prospectively difficult 
rebuttal process, even if the firm followed strict guidelines in creating the screening 
procedures. 
¶48 Assuming that an SSO decided that the evidentiary concerns were outweighed by 
the benefits of additional participation, another important issue to resolve is how close to 
a particular technology an individual must be to be precluded from participating.  In the 
interests of having the most knowledgeable individuals involved in the standard-setting 
process, the SSO would want to include people who are intimately familiar with the 
technologies being examined without actually having worked as a member of the 
research and development team developing those technologies.  Again, however the SSO 
chooses to draw that line, it must be clearly defined in the patent policy for it to be 
effective. 
3. Different Member Classes 
¶49 Under most current SSO policies, there are only two classes of entities: members 
and non-members.  This rather simplistic classification only allows for different licensing 
arrangements between members and non-members if the SSO so chooses.  An alternative 
to this approach is to add a third class: non-voting members.119  This non-voting class 
would allow broader participation in standardization meetings, thereby increasing the 
overall knowledge base of the group, but the members who decline to disclose their IP to 
the group would not be allowed to vote for or against a given standard.120  In return, the 
non-voting members would not be required to disclose their current and pending patent 
rights to the group, and would therefore not risk losing those rights. 
¶50 As an initial matter, these non-voting members would have to declare their interests 
and intentions from the beginning of discussions about a particular standard.  
Accordingly, the voting members would know who the non-voting members are at the 
 
117 See Cromley v. Board of Education of Lockport Township High School District 205, 17 F.3d 1059, 
1066 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a presumption of shared confidences in the legal screening procedure 
context is rebuttable).  If the presumption was non-rebuttable, the benefits mentioned in this section would 
not apply because the “new” system would be identical to the current system of strict liability for vicarious 
enterprise knowledge. 
118 See Amurol Confections Co. v. Morris Nat., Inc., No. 03-C-1264, 2003 WL 21321344, at *4 (N.D. 
Ill. June 5, 2003) (finding that a law firm had successfully rebutted a presumption of shared confidences by 
a showing of “carefully constructed safeguards”). 
119 There are currently some SSOs that allow both voting and non-voting members.  See Carvill & 
Khoja, supra note 68, at 289. 
120 Although any restriction on voting privileges may result in a “specter of collusion,” if the members 
themselves have opted for a lower level of participation, it is unlikely that any antitrust concerns would 
arise.  See id. 
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outset, and should likely consider the non-voting members’ input as at least potentially 
biased towards that member’s own IP rights. 
¶51 The advantages of this system include increased participation in SSOs and 
increased technological options presented to the voting body.  By appreciably limiting the 
risk of a firm losing its IP rights upon participation in the standard-setting process, there 
is less of a barrier to becoming involved in SSOs.  Therefore, many industry leaders who 
had previously chosen not to become members based upon a risk of losing their IP rights 
would likely participate as non-voting members if only to showcase their current IP to the 
SSO voting committee.  However, once they have begun participating, they would also 
likely attempt to point out any perceived weaknesses and shortcomings in other offered 
technologies, whether those ideas were offered by other non-voting competitors or by 
voting members who were attempting to design around certain IP rights.121  This 
increased participation would invariably lead to a greater knowledge base with which to 
judge and offer suggestions for future standards. 
¶52 Even in the unlikely event that the non-voting members only participate to the 
extent they would have to in order to promote and advertise technologies which 
implicated their IP rights, the SSOs would still benefit because they would have more 
available options from which to choose.  Currently, most standards bodies are limited to 
choosing among known IP and ideas from members.122  Although SSOs often eschew 
standards based on patented technology, there are often reasons for choosing such a 
standard.123  If the SSO has carefully considered all of the available options before it, 
including public domain solutions, and still chooses to adopt a standard based on patented 
technology, that technology must truly represent the best embodiment of what the SSO 
set out to standardize.  Theoretically, this analysis must consider the increased costs of 
production that are associated with having to license the technology from the patent 
owner.  However, SSOs are currently undertaking such a cost-benefit analysis every time 
they consider patented technologies for standardization, so this option would not 
significantly increase the procedural costs of SSOs in making their decisions.  Rather, the 
increase in highly-qualified candidates for standardization should allow the dismissal of 
lesser candidates more easily than if there were fewer standards options. 
¶53 The possible problems with this system are ones that already exist in the current 
SSO policies.  A non-voting entity may decide that, by disclosing its preferences in 
technology to the SSO, the SSO would automatically presume that the firm has or will 
have IP rights in those preferences, and the SSO would thus attempt to design around 
those particular preferences.  Operating under this assumption, a firm may decide not to 
participate in the meetings at all in the hopes that the SSO will potentially define a 
standard that implicates the firm’s patented technology.  However, the SSO is no worse 
off with the firm not participating for that reason than for the reason of potentially losing 
its IP rights. 
 
121 Through intensified challenging of proffered technologies, a more complete examination of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the technology candidates is achieved. 
122 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
123 See Schneck, supra note 8, at 647 (stating that SSOs may standardize on a patented technology if it is 
superior to any other technologies). 




¶54 As recent litigation has shown, SSO patent policies are often legally unenforceable 
due to their ambiguous nature or procedural loopholes.  Thus, as an initial matter, SSOs 
should at the very least reexamine their policies and clarify the who, what, when, and 
how of participant IP disclosure, licensing, and voting requirements.  Also, the SSOs 
must implement and follow procedures that ensure that each participant is aware of the 
terms of the patent policy and has agreed to abide by them.  These “fine-tuning” efforts 
by themselves would likely lead to somewhat increased participation by industry leaders, 
but their effect is likely to be minimal in relation to more significant modifications of the 
SSO policies.  Therefore, more dramatic changes such as the creation of standardized 
SSO patent policy frameworks, screening procedures, and the allowance of different 
member classes should also be examined as potential alternatives to the current paradigm. 
